Falling Behind: Has Rising Inequality Fueled the American Debt Boom?∗

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Abstract

We evaluate the hypothesis that rising inequality was a causal source of the US household debt boom since 1980. The mechanism builds on the observation that households care about their social status. To keep up with the ever richer Joneses, the middle class substitutes status-enhancing houses for status-neutral consumption. These houses are mortgage-financed, creating a debt boom across the income distribution. Using a stylized model we show analytically that aggregate debt increases as top incomes rise. In a quantitative general equilibrium model we show that Keeping up with the Joneses and rising income inequality generate 60% of the observed boom in mortgage debt and 50% of the house price boom. We compare this channel to two competing mechanisms. The Global Saving Glut hypothesis gives rise to a similar debt boom, but does not generate a house prices boom. Loosening collateral constraints does not generate booms in either debt or house prices. Finally, we provide novel empirical evidence on the relationship between top incomes and household debt. Mortgage debt rose substantially more in US states that experienced stronger growth in top incomes. There is no such relationship between top incomes and non-mortgage debt. These findings support to the importance of the comparisons channel.

Keywords: mortgages, housing boom, social comparisons, consumption networks, keeping up with the Joneses

JEL Codes: D14, D31, E21, E44, E70, R21

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1 Introduction

Between 1980 and 2007, US household debt doubled relative to GDP. Mortgage debt was by far the most important driver of this household debt boom (see Figure 1a). In lockstep with mortgages, top income inequality has risen since 1980 and reached its peak in 2007 (see Figures 1b and 3). The close link between top incomes and mortgage debt is not only present on aggregate but also on the level of US states. During this time period, mortgage-debt of the non-rich has grown substantially faster in US states that experienced stronger growth in top incomes (see Figure 2). In the public debate, it was argued that rising top income inequality fueled the boom in household debt (e.g. Rajan, 2010; Stiglitz, 2009; Frank, 2013), which in turn played an important role in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 and the ensuing Great Recession.

In this paper, we assess the hypothesis that rising top income inequality was a causal driver of the mortgage boom empirically, theoretically and quantitatively. The key mechanism builds on a large literature showing that households’ consumption-savings decisions are shaped by social comparisons. When top incomes rise and the rich upgrade their houses, the non-rich lose some of their social status and substitute status-enhancing housing for status-neutral consumption to keep up with the richer Joneses. These houses are mortgage-financed, causing a debt boom across the whole income distribution.

First and foremost, we quantify the contribution of this mechanism to the observed mortgage and house price booms (Figure 4) between 1980 and 2007 and compare it to two alternative mechanisms in the literature. First, the Global Saving Glut hypothesis (e.g. Bernanke, 2005; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2014) according to which foreign capital inflow has driven down interest rates and hence enabled households to take out more debt. Second, financial liberalization (e.g. Favilukis, Ludvigson, and van Nieuwerburgh, 2017), which may increase borrowing due to a loosening of collateral constraints.

To that end, we build a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model with housing and non-durable consumption goods, elastic housing supply, a collateral constraint, a state-of-the-art earnings process (Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song, 2019) and a social comparison motive that we discipline using recent micro evidence on housing comparisons in the US (Bellet, 2019). We compare two steady states that differ only in the exogenous degree of income inequality. Based on evidence by Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) and Guvenen, Kaplan, Song, and Weidner (2018) we scale the permanent component of income inequality to match the increase in cross-sectional income dispersion between 1980 and 2007.

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1 We show that this relationship is robust and the effect is sizable and persistent.
2 See the survey by van Treeck (2014) on the hypothesis that inequality caused the financial crisis.
3 The idea that people care about how their belongings compare to those of their neighbors is certainly not new (among others Veblen, 1899; Duesenberry, 1949). Recently, there has been a growing empirical literature showing that social comparisons shape people’s decision-making (e.g. Kuhn, Kooreman, Soetevent, and Kapteyn, 2011; Luttmer, 2005; Bursztyn, Ederer, Ferman, and Yuchtman, 2014; De Giorgi, Frederiksen, and Pistaferri, 2019). Housing is among the most visible and status-relevant goods and the most important good in terms of expenditure share (Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Bertrand and Morse, 2016a).
4 The expectations channel (Adam, Kuang, and Marcet, 2012; Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante, 2020) is another important channel, but it cannot be easily integrated into our model.
We find that this rise in income inequality generates quantitatively significant mortgage and house price booms in the presence of *Keeping up with the Joneses*. Our model generates 60% of the observed increase in the mortgage-to-income ratio and 50% of the observed increase in house prices between 1980 and 2007. Even in the absence of *Keeping up with the Joneses* rising inequality drives house prices through growing demand for housing at the top of the income distribution. Complementarities between housing and non-durable consumption increase housing and mortgage demand of non-rich households. These general equilibrium effects are roughly doubled by social comparisons. Social comparisons directly raise the housing demand (and thereby mortgage demand) for non-rich households who respond to choices of the rich because of the status externality.

In comparison, the Saving Glut generates a similarly strong debt boom through lower interest rates. However, we find that it does not generate a strong house price increase. Both mechanisms together can explain 75% of the increase in the mortgage-to-income ratio and 60% of the house prices boom. Decomposing this total effect, we can attribute between one third and two thirds of the explained increase in debt and about 90% of the explained increase in house prices to rising inequality and social comparisons. Financial innovation, i.e., relaxed collateral constraints, raises neither debt nor house prices significantly.

In addition to the quantitative results, we show in closed form how top incomes can affect aggregate debt in a stylized version of the model without idiosyncratic earnings risk. In this infinite horizon network model (extending the one-period models in Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou, 2006; Ghiglino and Goyal, 2010), we prove that an individual’s debt is increasing in top incomes if the household cares about the rich (directly or indirectly). Moreover, we prove that if comparisons are upward looking (i.e., everybody cares about the rich directly or indirectly), aggregate debt is increasing in top incomes.

Finally, we show empirically that non-rich debt and top incomes co-move not only on aggregate but also on the level of US states. We use distributional national accounts (DINA) data (Piketty, Saez, and Zucman, 2018) to show that debt of non-rich households grew substantially faster in US states that experienced stronger increases in top incomes. This novel feature of the US debt boom is persistent and sizable. Controlling for own income as well as state and year fixed effects, an increase in lagged top incomes by 1% is associated with 0.17% higher total debt and 0.27% higher mortgage debt for households outside the top income decile. The elasticity of non-rich mortgage debt with respect to top incomes is even stronger for households above the median. Using local projections we find that a 1% increase in top incomes is associated with a cumulative 1% increase in mortgage debt after 10 years. The fact that top incomes lead to higher mortgage-to-income ratios of non-rich households *in the same state* underscores the importance of the *comparisons channel*. The Saving Glut – the other mechanism that explains a significant share of the debt boom – is not able to account for this important feature because financial markets are largely integrated. Local demand for savings need not be compensated by local debt. Instead, arbitrage should lead to a uniform increase in debt of the non-rich across all states.\(^5\)

\(^5\)Note, that these findings are complementary to Mian, Straub, and Sufi (2020) who document that the increasingly richer rich hold debt of non-rich households all across the country as an asset. We find
Figure 1: The American household debt boom and rising income inequality

(A) Decomposition of the debt boom

(B) Mortgages (left axis) and inequality (right)

Notes: This figure shows the relationship of aggregate household debt (total, mortgage, non-mortgage) as share of GDP and the top 10% income share over time. Data sources: US Flow of Funds and Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2016). Details see Appendix A.

Figure 2: Long-run changes in non-rich debt and top incomes across US states

Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the change in debt-to-income (total, mortgage, non-mortgage) of non-rich households (bottom 90% of the income distribution) and the change in top 10% incomes between 1980 and 2007 across US states. Data source: DINA (Piketty et al., 2018) and IRS. See Section 6.

Figure 3: Distribution of income growth

Notes: This figure shows real average pre-tax income growth from 1962 to 2014 in the US. Data are taken from Piketty et al. (2018). Growth rates are relative to the base year 1980.

Figure 4: House prices in the US

Contributions to the literature

Our main contributions concern the growing literature on the macroeconomics of the mortgage and house price booms. This literature builds on a variety of mechanisms: looser collateral constraints (e.g., Favilukis et al., 2017), lending limits (Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2019), dynamics in foreign capital flows (Justiniano et al., 2014) and changes in house price expectations (Adam et al., 2012; Kaplan et al., 2020). Besides introducing a novel mechanism into this literature, we provide new insights and confirm findings on two other mechanisms. First, consistent with Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2011) and others, we find that relaxation of collateral constraints does not generate sizable effects on debt and house prices. Second, we confirm that foreign capital inflows can have sizable effects on household debt. In our model, the Saving Glut generates effects similar to those in Justiniano et al. (2014).

Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) propose an alternative causal mechanism that links inequality and the debt boom (we call it the savings channel). According to the savings channel debt growth is driven by the appetite for savings of the rich. Asset market clearing dictates that the non-rich have to take out debt to match the savings of the rich. This hypothesis is echoed by Mian et al. (2020) who show that most of the debt of the non-rich is held by the rich.

We show empirically that the savings channel alone cannot explain all aspects of the debt boom. First, it cannot generate the relationship across US states. And second, it cannot explain why there is a sizable positive relationship between top incomes and mortgage debt, but none for non-mortgage debt. The comparisons channel put forward in this paper generates both of these empirical findings. It should be regarded as an important complementary channel explaining the relationship between top income inequality and debt.

In addition, a growing literature analyzes the consumption response to house price changes (Guren, McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson, 2020; Garriga and Hedlund, 2020; Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, and Vavra, 2018). It finds that consumption reacts more when houses are bigger. Our model implies that house values become an ever bigger share of lifetime income when top incomes rise. Thus, rising top income inequality is amplifying the consumption response in financial crises.

Our findings also contribute to the literature on distributional macroeconomics (e.g., Kaplan and Violante, 2014; Ahn, Kaplan, Moll, Winberry, and Wolf, 2017; Kaplan, Moll, and Violante, 2018), providing a novel reason why “inequality matters for macro”. Rising income inequality has an effect on macroeconomic outcomes like house prices and aggregate mortgage debt as agents are linked not only through prices but also directly through social externalities of their consumption decisions. Another recent paper that builds on well-established micro insights to connect households in a macroeconomic model

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that if a state’s rich get richer, the non-rich in the same state take on more mortgage debt. Hence, by the same arguments any kind of Saving Glut will not be able to explain the state-level link between top incomes and non-rich debt.

6This is in contrast to Favilukis et al. (2017) who generate sizable effects in their model with a large fraction of agents close to the collateral constraint.
is Fogli and Guerrieri (2019) who show that socioeconomic segregation amplifies income inequality.

A large empirical literature has established that social comparisons matter for well-being (e.g. Luttmer, 2005; Card, Mas, Moretti, and Saez, 2012; Perez-Truglia, 2019) and economic choices (Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov, 2009; Kuhn et al., 2011; Bursztyn et al., 2014; Bertrand and Morse, 2016b; Bursztyn, Ferman, Fiorin, Kanz, and Rao, 2017; Bellet, 2019; De Giorgi et al., 2019). While the macroeconomic effects of keeping up with the Joneses have already been studied in the context of representative agent models (e.g. Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000), we introduce social comparisons into a quantitative heterogeneous agents model.

We build on the macroeconomic literature on keeping up with the Joneses and bring it closer to the empirical evidence. First, we distinguish between conspicuous and non-conspicuous goods. In our model households compare themselves only in their houses, arguably the most important conspicuous good (e.g. Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Bertrand and Morse, 2016b). And second, agents compare themselves to the rich (e.g. Card et al., 2012; Bellet, 2019). Households only lose satisfaction with their own house, when a big house is built.7

Our analytical results extend those by Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) and Ballester et al. (2006) who show that agents’ choices depend on the strengths of social links in a one-period model. We extend their network models to infinite horizon and add a durable good (housing) to show that debt is increasing in the centrality of an agent. The centrality is reinterpreted as the weighted sum of incomes of the comparison group.

**Structure of the paper** The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3 we derive analytically how top incomes drive debt in a stylized version of the model. In Section 4 we describe the parameterization of the full model, followed by quantitative results in Section 5. In Section 6 we present empirical evidence on the relationship between household debt and top income inequality.

## 2 Model

We add social comparisons into an otherwise standard macroeconomic model of housing. Our model is a dynamic, incomplete markets general equilibrium model similar to the “canonical macroeconomic model with housing” in Piazzesi and Schneider (2016). We formulate our model in continuous time to take advantage of the fast solution methods of Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2017, in particular Section 4.3). We build our model with two aims in mind. First, we want to illustrate how rising top-incomes and social comparisons can lead to rising debt levels across the whole income distribution.

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7These novel modelling choices distinguish our paper from Badarinza (2019), who studies the effects of status externalities on housing debt in a lifecycle model with heterogeneous agents. He assumes that the reference measure is the average house. He departs from the *keeping up with the Joneses* tradition by assuming that status is additively separable from flow utility.
And second, we want to quantify the effect of this channel on the increase in aggregate mortgage debt and house prices from 1980 to 2007.

2.1 Setup

Time is continuous and runs forever. There is a continuum of households that differ in their realizations of the earnings process. Households are indexed by their current portfolio holdings \((a_t, h_t)\), where \(a_t\) denotes financial wealth and \(h_t\) denotes the housing stock, and their pre-tax earnings \(y_t\). They supply labor inelastically to the non-durable consumption good and housing construction sectors. The financial intermediary collects households’ savings and extends mortgages subject to a collateral constraint. The state of the economy is the joint distribution \(\mu_t(da, dh, dy)\). There is no aggregate uncertainty.

2.2 Households

Households die at an exogenous mortality rate \(m > 0\). The wealth of the deceased is redistributed to surviving individuals in proportion to their asset holdings (perfect annuity markets). Dead households are replaced by newborn households with zero initial wealth and earnings drawn from its ergodic distribution.\(^8\) Households derive utility from a non-durable consumption good \(c\) and housing status \(s\). They supply labor inelastically and receive earnings \(y\). After-tax disposable earnings are given by

\[
\tilde{y}_t = y_t - T(y_t),
\]

where \(T\) is the tax function. Households choose streams of consumption \(c_t > 0\), housing \(h_t > 0\) and assets \(a_t \in \mathbb{R}\) to maximize their expected discounted lifetime utility

\[
\mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^{\infty} e^{-(\rho + m)t} \frac{(1 - \epsilon) c_t^{1-\epsilon} + \xi s(h_t, \bar{h}) \epsilon}{1 - \gamma} \, dt,
\]

where \(\rho \geq 0\) is the discount rate and the expectation is taken over realizations of idiosyncratic earnings shocks. \(1/\gamma > 0\) is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, \(1/(1 - \epsilon) > 0\) is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing status and \(\xi \in (0, 1)\) is the relative utility-weight for housing status.

A household’s utility from housing is a function of the housing status \(s(h, \bar{h})\). Housing status increases in the household’s housing stock \(h\) and decreases in reference housing \(\bar{h}\) which is a function of the equilibrium distribution of housing as introduced in the next section.

Housing is both a consumption good and an asset. It is modeled as a homogenous, divisible good. As such, \(h\) represents a one-dimensional measure of housing quality (including size, location and amenities). An agent’s housing stock depreciates at rate \(\delta\) and

\(^8\)This follows Kaplan et al. (2018).
can be adjusted frictionlessly. Home improvements and maintenance expenditures $x_t$ have the same price as housing ($p$) and go into the value of the housing stock one for one.

Households can save ($a > 0$) and borrow ($a < 0$) at the equilibrium interest rate $r$. Borrowers must post their house as collateral to satisfy an exogenous collateral constraint. The collateral constraint pins down the maximum possible loan-to-value ratio $\omega$.

Households’ assets evolve according to

$\dot{a}_t = \tilde{y}_t + r_t a_t - c_t - p_t x_t,$

$\dot{h}_t = -\delta h_t + x_t,$

subject to the constraints

$a_t \geq -\omega p_t h_t,$

$h_t > 0.$

### 2.3 Social comparisons

We build on the macroeconomic literature (e.g. Abell, 1990; Gali, 1994; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000) on keeping up with the Joneses and bring it closer to the empirical evidence. These papers feature representative agent models with one good and one asset. Agents compare themselves in the single consumption good, and their reference measure is the average consumption in the economy.\(^9\)

We depart from this literature in two ways. First, we assume that households compare themselves only in their houses. This captures that people compare themselves only in conspicuous goods and that housing is one of the most important conspicuous goods—both in terms of visibility and expenditure share (e.g. Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Bertrand and Morse, 2016b).

Second, we allow the reference measure to be a function of the distribution of houses (and not necessarily its mean): $\tilde{h}_i = \tilde{h}_i(\mu_h)$. This reflects that the comparison motive is asymmetric, being strongest (and best documented) with respect to the rich (e.g. Clark and Senik, 2010; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Card et al., 2012, on self-reported well-being). People buy bigger cars when their neighbors win in the lottery (Kuhn et al., 2011); non-rich move their expenditures to visible goods (such as housing) when top incomes rise in their state (Bertrand and Morse, 2016b); and construction of very big houses leads to substantially lower levels of self-reported housing satisfaction for other residents in the same area—while the construction of small houses does not (Bellet, 2019).

For our analytical results we assume that $\tilde{h}$ is a weighted mean of the housing distribution and use $s(h, \tilde{h}) = h - \phi \tilde{h}$ for tractability. For the quantitative results, we set $\tilde{h}$ to the 90th percentile of the housing distribution and use $s(h, \tilde{h}) = \frac{h}{\tilde{h}}^{\phi}$ based on empirical evidence (see Section 4).

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\(^9\)Frictionless adjustment is justified, because we will be comparing long-run changes (over a period of 27 years).

\(^{10}\)In equilibrium the reference measure has to be equal to the optimal choice of the representative agent.
2.4 Pre-tax earnings process

In our main experiment, we want to adjust life-time (permanent) income inequality independently of income risk to capture the way income inequality has changed over time. We follow Guvenen et al. (2019), who estimate a pre-tax earnings process on administrative earnings data. The process consists of (i) individual fixed effects (\(\alpha_i\)), a persistent jump-drift process (\(z_{it}\)), a transitory jump-drift process (\(\epsilon_{it}\)), and heterogeneous non-employment shocks (\(\nu_{it}\)).\(^{11}\) We translate their estimated process to continuous time. Heterogeneity in \(\alpha_i\) represents fixed ex-ante differences in earnings ability which is an important source of life-time inequality. The innovations of both the transitory and persistent process are drawn from mixture distributions to match higher order moments of income risk and impulse response functions. Finally, Guvenen et al. (2019) show that a non-employment shock with \(z\)-dependent shock probabilities greatly improves the model fit.\(^{12}\)

If employed, individual pre-tax earnings are given by

\[
y^\text{pot}_{it} = \exp(\tilde{\alpha}_i + z_{it} + \epsilon_{it}).
\]

We will refer to \(y^\text{pot}\) as potential earnings. The actual pre-tax earnings (taking into account unemployment) are

\[
y_{it} = (1 - \nu_{it})y^\text{pot}_{it},
\]

where

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{\alpha}_i &\sim N(\mu_\alpha, \sigma_\alpha), \\
dz_{it} &= -\theta^z z_{it}dt + dJ^z_{it}, \\
d\epsilon_{it} &= -\theta^\epsilon \epsilon_{it}dt + dJ^\epsilon_{it}.
\end{align*}
\]

\(J^z_{it}\) is a jump-process that arrives at rate \(\lambda^z\). The size of the jump, \(\eta^z_{it}\) is drawn from a mixture of two normal distributions,

\[
\eta^z_{it} = \begin{cases} N(-z^\mu(1-p^z), \sigma^z_1) & \text{with prob. } p^z \\ N(z^\mu - p^z z^\mu, \sigma^z_2) & \text{with prob. } 1-p^z. \end{cases}
\]

Similarly, the jump process for the transitory process arrives at rate \(\lambda^\epsilon\) and the jump size, \(\eta^\epsilon_{it}\) is drawn from a mixture of two normal distributions,

\[
\eta^\epsilon_{it} = \begin{cases} N(-\epsilon_{it} + \mu^\epsilon(1-p^\epsilon), \sigma^\epsilon_1) & \text{with prob. } p^\epsilon \\ N(-\epsilon_{it} - p^\epsilon \mu^\epsilon, \sigma^\epsilon_2) & \text{with prob. } 1-p^\epsilon. \end{cases}
\]

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\(^{11}\)We use version (7), where we take out the deterministic life-cycle profile. The only component that this version does not have are differences in deterministic income growth rates.

\(^{12}\)The only component that is missing compared to the Benchmark process is fixed heterogeneous income profiles, i.e. ex-ante permanent heterogeneity in lifecycle income growth rates.
The key difference between the persistent and the transitory process is that the jumps in the former are added to the current state whereas the jumps in the latter process reset the process such that the post-jump state is centered around zero.

The nonemployment shock arrives at rate $\lambda_0'(z_{it})$ and has average duration $1/\lambda_1'$. Specifically, the arrival probability as a function of the current state of the persistent process is modeled as

$$
\lambda_0'(z_{it})dt = \frac{\exp(a + bz_{it})}{1 + \exp(a + bz_{it})}.
$$

### 2.5 Production

There are two competitive production sectors producing the non-durable consumption good $c$ and new housing investment $I_h$, respectively. Following Kaplan et al. (2020), there is no productive capital in this economy.

**Non-Durable Consumption Sector**  The final consumption good is produced using a linear production function

$$
Y_c = N_c
$$

where $N_c$ are units of labor working in the consumption good sector. As total labor supply is normalized to one, $N_c$ is also the share of total labor working in this sector. The equilibrium wage per unit of labor is pinned down at $w = 1$.

**Construction Sector**  We model the housing sector following Kaplan et al. (2020) and Favilukis et al. (2017). Developers produce housing investment $I_h$ from labor $N_h = 1 - N_c$ and buildable land $\bar{L}$, $I_h = (\Theta N_h)^{\alpha}(\bar{L})^{1-\alpha}$ with $\alpha \in (0, 1)$. Each period, the government issues new permits equivalent to $\bar{L}$ units of land, and these are sold at a competitive market price to developers. A developer solves

$$
\max_{N_h} p_h I_h - w N_h \quad \text{s.t.} \quad I_h = N_h^\alpha \bar{L}^{1-\alpha}
$$

In equilibrium, this yields the following expression for optimal housing investment

$$
I_h = (\alpha p)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} \bar{L}
$$

which implies a price elasticity of aggregate housing supply of $\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$.

### 2.6 Financial markets

The financial intermediary collects savings from households and issues mortgages to households. Lending is limited by the households’ exogenous collateral constraint (1).

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13Neither labor supply nor the wage appear in the earnings process, because there is no aggregate risk, households inelastically supply one unit of labor, and the wage is equal to 1.
In addition, the intermediary has an exogenous net asset position with the rest of the world $a^S_t$. The equilibrium interest ensures that bank profits are zero and the asset market clears,
\[ \int a_t(a, h, y) d\mu_t = a_t^S. \] (2)

2.7 Stationary Equilibrium

A stationary equilibrium is a joint distribution $\mu(a, h, y)$, policy functions $c(a, h, y, \bar{h})$, $x(a, h, y, \bar{h})$, $h(a, h, y, \bar{h})$, $a(a, h, y, \bar{h})$, prices $(p, r)$ and a reference measure $\bar{h}$ satisfying the following conditions

- Policy functions are consistent with agents’ optimal choices $(c_t, h_t, a_t)_{t>0}$ given incomes $(y_t)_{t>0}$, prices $p, r$ and the reference measure $\bar{h}$.
- Housing investment is such that the construction sector maximizes profits.
- $\mu(a, h, y)$ is stationary. That is, if the economy starts at $\mu$, it will stay there.
- Asset market clears (2) and housing investment equals housing production $\int x(a, h, y) d\mu = I_h$.
- The reference measure is consistent with choices: $\bar{h} = \bar{h}(\mu)$.

3 Analytical Results

In this section we use a stylized version of the model described in section 2 to illustrate how rising top incomes can lead to rising mortgage levels across the whole income distribution via social comparisons. In this section we show analytically the following results.

In Proposition 1 we provide formulas for optimal housing and consumption, as functions of their permanent incomes, and the permanent incomes of the direct and indirect reference groups. In Proposition 2 we show that optimal debt is increasing in the incomes of the direct and indirect reference groups. In Proposition 3 we show that the impact of rising incomes $\tilde{y}_i$ on aggregate debt is increasing in type $i$’s popularity. In Corollary 1 we show that total debt-to-income is increasing in top incomes if at least one person compares themselves to the rich. In Corollary 2 we show that under Cobb-Douglas aggregation ($\varepsilon = 0$), these results hold even under housing market clearing because they are independent of house prices $p$. In Corollary 3 we show that these results crucially depend on the fact the status good $h$ is durable.

The assumptions needed to obtain tractability are that there is no idiosyncratic income risk; that the social status function is linear; and that the interest rate equals the discount rate (all of these assumptions are relaxed in the following sections).

**Assumption 1.** $r = \rho$.

Further, we assume that there is a finite number of types of households $i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$. Agents vary by their initial endowments $a_0$ and flow disposable income $\tilde{y}$.

**Assumption 2.** Flow income $\tilde{y}_i$ is deterministic and constant over time, but varies across types $i$. 

11
Without loss of generality, we assume that types are ordered by their permanent income $\mathcal{Y}_i = r a_i^0 + \bar{y}_i$, $\mathcal{Y}_1 \leq \mathcal{Y}_2 \leq \ldots \leq \mathcal{Y}_N$.

We use bold variables to denote the vector variables for each type using the above ordering, e.g. $\mathbf{h} = (h_1, \ldots, h_N)^T$.

**Assumption 3** (Tractable social comparisons). The status function $s(h, \bar{h}) = h - \phi \bar{h}$ is linear and the reference measure $\bar{h}_i = \sum_{j \neq i} g_{ij} h_j$ is a weighted sum of other agent’s housing stock (we assume $g_{ij} \geq 0$).

Note, that we can write the vector of reference measures as $\bar{h} = (\bar{h}_1, \ldots, \bar{h}_N)^T = G \cdot h := (g_{ij}(h_i))$. The matrix $G$ can be interpreted as the adjacency matrix of the network of types capturing the comparison links between agents of each type. $g_{ij}$ measures how strongly agent $i$ cares about agent $j$.

We further require the comparisons to satisfy the following regularity condition.

**Assumption 4.** The Leontief inverse $(I - \phi G)^{-1}$ exists and is equal to $\sum_{i=0}^\infty \phi^i G^i$ for $\phi$ from Assumption 3.

This assumption is not very strong. This assumption is satisfied whenever the power of the matrix converges, $G^i \to G^\infty$. For example, if $G$ represents a Markov chain with a stationary distribution or if $G$ is nilpotent.

### 3.1 Characterization of the partial equilibrium

We solve for a simplified version of the equilibrium in Section 2.7. Agents solve their optimization problem given prices and the reference measure; the reference measure is consistent; but for now, we don’t require market clearing. We use a lifetime budget constraint instead of the implicit transversality condition.

Households optimal decisions are given in the following proposition.

**Proposition 1.** Under assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 the optimal choices $\mathbf{h} = (h_1, \ldots, h_N)^T$ and $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \ldots, a_N)^T$ are given by

$$h = \left( \sum_{i=0}^\infty (\kappa_1 \phi G)^i \right) \kappa_2 \mathcal{Y},$$

$$-r a = \bar{y} - \kappa_3 \mathcal{Y} + (1 - \kappa_3) \left( \sum_{i=1}^\infty (\kappa_1 \phi G)^i \right) \mathcal{Y}$$

(3)

where $\kappa_1 = \frac{1}{p r + 1 + \xi p} \in (0, 1)$, $\kappa_2 = \frac{\kappa_1}{\kappa_0}$, $\kappa_3 = \frac{1}{1 + (\frac{1}{p} + \xi p)} \in (0, 1)$ and $\kappa_0 = \left( r + \delta \frac{1 - \xi p}{\xi} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\xi}}$.

**Proof.** See appendix B.2. □

Households’ choices depend on a weighted average of the permanent incomes of their (direct and indirect) reference groups. The weights are positive, whenever there is a direct or indirect social link between those agents. This is captured by the *income-weighted*...
Bonacich centrality, $B = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty}(C_1\phi G)^i\mathbf{Y}$. If the weight $B_{ij}$ is positive, household $j$’s lifetime income affects household $i$’s choices. This is the case whenever $j$ is in $i$’s reference group (there is a direct link $g_{ij} > 0$), or if $j$ is in the reference group of some agent $k$ who is in the reference group of agent $i$ (there is an indirect link of length two, $g_{ik}g_{kj} > 0$) or if there is any other indirect link ($\prod_{n=1}^{N-1} g_{\ell_{n-1}}\ell_{n+1}$ where $\ell_1 = i$ and $\ell_{N-1} = j$).

These results are reminiscent of those in Ballester et al. (2006). They showed that the unique Nash equilibrium in a large class of network games is proportional to the (standard) Bonacich centrality.

### 3.2 Comparative statics

First, we show that optimal debt and optimal housing are increasing in incomes of the direct and indirect comparison groups.

**Proposition 2.** For each type $j$ in $i$’s reference group (that is, $g_{ij} > 0$) and for each $k$ that is in the reference group of the reference group (etc.) of $i$ (that is, there is $j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_n$ such that $g_{ij_1}g_{j_1j_2}\cdots g_{j_{n-1}j_n}g_{j_nk} > 0$), then $h_i$ is increasing and $a_i$ is decreasing in $\mathbf{Y}_j$ (or $\mathbf{Y}_k$).

**Proof.** $G$ is non-negative, so $\sum_c c^i G^i$ is non-negative for all $c \geq 0$. From the definition of the Leontief inverse, being the discounted sum of direct and indirect links it follows,

$$\frac{\partial h_i}{\partial \tilde{y}_j} > \kappa_2 \kappa_1 \phi g_{ij} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial h_i}{\partial \tilde{y}_k} > \kappa_2 (\kappa_1 \phi)^{n-1} g_{ij_1}g_{j_1j_2}\cdots g_{j_{n-1}j_n}g_{j_nk} > 0.$$

Similarly

$$-\frac{\partial a_i}{\partial \tilde{y}_j} > (1 - \kappa_3) \kappa_1 \phi g_{ij} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad -\frac{\partial a_i}{\partial \tilde{y}_k} > (1 - \kappa_3) (\kappa_1 \phi)^{n-1} \phi g_{ij_1}g_{j_1j_2}\cdots g_{j_{n-1}j_n}g_{j_nk} > 0.$$  

Agent A’s debt increases if agent B’s lifetime income increases—as long as there is a direct or indirect link from A to B. That link exists, if agent A cares about agent B, or if agent A cares about some agent C who cares about agent B.

Second, we show how aggregate housing and debt react to changes in type $j$’s income $\mathbf{Y}_j$. We first define the popularity of a type.

**Definition 1** (Popularity). We define the vector of popularities as

$$b^T = 1^T \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} (\kappa_1 \phi G)^i,$$

and type $i$’s popularity $b_i$ as the $i$th component of $b$.

The popularity is the sum of all paths that end at individual $i$. It measures how many agents compare themselves with $i$ (directly and indirectly) and how strongly they do. The popularity of a type is crucial in determining how strongly their income will affect economic aggregates.
Proposition 3. The impact of a change in type $j$'s on aggregate housing and aggregate debt is proportional to its popularity.

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \tilde{y}_j} \sum_i h_i = \kappa_2 (1 + b_j) \\
\frac{\partial}{\partial \tilde{y}_j} \sum_i r a_i = (1 - \kappa_3) (1 + b_j).
\]

**Proof.** Take the expressions from proposition 1 and plug in the definitions for $Y$ and $b$ (Definition 1), aggregate housing can be written as $\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_i = \kappa_2 \sum_{i=1}^{N} (1 + b_i) (\tilde{y}_i + r a_0^i)$ and aggregate debt can be written as $- \sum_{i=1}^{N} r a_i = (1 - \kappa_3) \sum \tilde{y}_i - \kappa_3 \sum a_0^i + (1 - \kappa_3) \sum_{i=1}^{N} b_i (\tilde{y}_i + r a_0^i)$. The derivatives follow immediately.

**Corollary 1.** If all types $i \neq j$ are connected to agent $j$ and $\tilde{y}_j$ increases, then debt-to-income increases for all types $i \neq j$.

**Proof.** By Proposition 2 debt of types $i \neq j$ increases, while their income is unchanged. It follows that debt-to-income rises.

**Corollary 2.** Under Cobb-Douglas aggregation, the results for $a$ in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are independent of house prices.

**Proof.** Under Cobb-Douglas $\kappa_0$ is divisible by $p$. This means that $p$ cancels in $\kappa_1$ and $\kappa_3$. Thus, all $p$ cancel in the expression for $a$ in Proposition 1 and consequently doesn’t show up in the respective expressions in Propositions 2 and 3.

The results on optimal debt in Propositions 2 and 3 and Corollary 1 break down if houses are not durable. When houses are non-durable, for any small time interval $\Delta$, the depreciation rate has to be $\delta = \frac{1}{\Delta}$, so that the housing stock depreciates immediately,

\[(1 - \Delta \delta) h_t = 0.\]

To analyze this case in continuous time, we thus let the depreciation rate $\delta$ go to infinity.

**Corollary 3.** When $\delta \to \infty$, optimal debt does not depend on others’ incomes.

**Proof.** It can be easily seen that $\kappa_3 \to 1$ as $\delta \to \infty$, thus $(1 - \kappa_3) \to 0$. Since all other terms in expression (3) are bounded, the part containing the Leontief inverse vanishes and becomes $- ra = \tilde{y} - Y = - r a_0$.

**3.3 How rising top incomes fuel the mortgage boom: Intuition**

It is at the heart of the mechanism that there is a complementarity between a household’s housing stock and their reference measure. When top incomes $\mathcal{Y}_N$ rise, households of type $N$ will improve (or upsize) their housing stock $h_N$, increasing the reference measure $\bar{h}_i$ for all types $i$ that care about type $N$ directly or indirectly. Each of these agents will optimally substitute durable, status-enhancing housing for non-durable status neutral consumption.
For debt to be affected it is key that the status good is durable and the status-neutral good in non-durable. Agents want their stock of the durable good to be constant over time. They need to pay for the whole good \( ph \) upfront and only replace the depreciation \( \delta ph \) in the future. Agents need to shift some of their lifetime income forward to finance their house. They use mortgages as an instrument to achieve that. The greater the value of the house, the bigger is the necessary mortgage.

Corollary 3 formalizes this intuition. It shows that if houses are non-durable (\( \delta \to \infty \)), the term containing the Leontief inverse of the adjacency matrix \( G \) vanishes.

### 3.4 Example: Upward comparisons with three types of agents

We now illustrate the results for the simple case of three types of agents, poor \( P \), middle class \( M \), and rich \( R \). The poor type compares himself with both other types, the middle type compares himself only with the rich type, and the rich type not at all. Figure 5 shows the corresponding graph and its adjacency matrix.

![Graph and Adjacency Matrix](image)

**Figure 5:** The social network structure with three types, assuming upward comparisons. The network can be represented as a graph and as its adjacency matrix.

Since \( G \) is a triangular matrix with only zeros on the diagonal, it is nilpotent (\( G^3 = 0 \)), and thus the Leontief inverse exists.

\[
G^2 = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & g_{PM}g_{MR} \\
0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}, \quad G^3 = 0
\]

The matrix \( G^2 \) counts the paths of length 2. In our example there is only one such path—from type \( P \) to type \( R \). Defining \( \tilde{\phi} = \kappa_1 \phi \), the vector of Bonacich centralities is given by

\[
\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \alpha^i G^i = I + \sum_{i=1}^{2} \alpha^i G^i = I + \begin{pmatrix}
0 & \alpha \cdot g_{PM} & \alpha \cdot g_{PR} + \alpha^2 \cdot g_{PM} \cdot g_{MR} \\
0 & 0 & \alpha \cdot g_{MR} \\
0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]
The partial equilibrium choices for housing and debt are now given by

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
 h_P \\
 h_M \\
 h_R
\end{pmatrix} = \kappa_2
\begin{pmatrix}
 1 & \tilde{\phi} \cdot g_{PM} & \tilde{\phi} \cdot g_{PR} + \tilde{\phi}^2 \cdot g_{PM} \cdot g_{MR} \\
 0 & 1 & \tilde{\phi} \cdot g_{MR} \\
 0 & 0 & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
 Y_P \\
 Y_M \\
 Y_R
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[-r
\begin{pmatrix}
 a_P \\
 a_M \\
 a_R
\end{pmatrix} = \tilde{y} - \kappa_3 Y + (1 - \kappa_3)
\begin{pmatrix}
 0 & \tilde{\phi} \cdot g_{PM} & \tilde{\phi} \cdot g_{PR} + \tilde{\phi}^2 \cdot g_{PM} \cdot g_{MR} \\
 0 & 0 & \tilde{\phi} \cdot g_{MR} \\
 0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
 Y_P \\
 Y_M \\
 Y_R
\end{pmatrix} \]

An agent’s housing choice increases linearly in own permanent income, \( Y = \tilde{y} + ra_0 \), and on the permanent income of agents in the reference group. The poor agent’s consumption increases through the direct links, but also indirect links (which are discounted more strongly). Agents’ decisions to save or borrow depend on the ratio of initial wealth \( a_0 \) and income \( \tilde{y} \). The higher the income relative to initial wealth, the greater the need to borrow.

4 Parameterization

Now we return to the full model. We parameterize the model to be consistent with the aggregate relationships of mortgage debt, house value and income in the US at the beginning of the 1980s. We use the estimated income process from Guvenen et al. (2019) and assign eight other parameters externally. The remaining two parameters (the discount rate \( \rho \) and the utility weight of housing status \( \xi \)) are calibrated internally so that in general equilibrium the aggregate net-worth-to-income ratio and aggregate loan-to-value ratio match these aggregate moments in the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances.

Income Process We translate the estimated income process from Guvenen et al. (2019) to continuous time. It has a permanent, a persistent and a transitory component and state-dependent unemployment risk. Guvenen et al. (2019) estimate it to data from the time period 1994–2013. In order to construct the income process for the baseline economy \( \mathcal{E} \) (corresponding to the year 1980) we rescale the permanent component following evidence on the changes in the income distribution from Kopczuk et al. (2010), Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song (2014) and Guvenen et al. (2018).

The cross-sectional dispersion of incomes has increased substantially between 1980 and 2007. Figure 6 (taken from Guvenen et al., 2018, Figure 12) shows the variation of three common measures over time: the P90/P50 ratio, the P90/P10 ratio and the standard deviation of log-earnings. These changes in the variation of incomes can come from either component of the income process, or even a combination of them.

While there is no consensus yet, as to which of those factors contributed how much, there is evidence that rising permanent inequality explains a substantial share in increased cross-sectional variation. Kopczuk et al. (2010, Figure V) find that almost all of the change in earnings variation came from increases in permanent inequality. This finding

\footnote{Carr and Wiemers (2016, 2018) show that depending on data source, sample selection, and statistical model one can find substantial differences in the decomposition into risk and permanent inequality.}
is supported by Guvenen et al. (2014, Figure 5) who show that the variances of earnings shocks have had a slight downward trend since 1980.

Given this evidence, we attribute all change in inequality to changes in permanent inequality ($\sigma_\alpha$). In our income process, permanent income inequality is represented by the permanent component $\tilde{\alpha}$. So, given the discretized version of the process, we stretch the upper half of the $\tilde{\alpha}$-grid to match the changes in the cross-sectional P90/P50 ratio.

When translating the process to continuous time, we assume that shocks arrive on average once a year (instead of every year). Moreover, we replace the discrete time iid process by jump-drift process ($\epsilon_{it}$) that is re-centered around zero whenever a shock hits so that shocks do not accumulate. The mean reversion rate of the persistent process ($z_{it}$) is the negative log of the discrete time persistence parameter which preserves the same annual autocorrelation. The exit rate out of nonemployment is chosen to match the average duration of nonemployment stays in the discrete time process. As households in our infinite horizon model die at a constant rate, we remove all age-dependence by setting the age profile constant (to the value at the mean age $\bar{t}$). Table 1 shows all parameters of our continuous time earnings process.

We put the process on a discrete state space, using the approach of Kaplan et al. (2018). We discretize each component separately, obtaining continuous-time Markov chains for the persistent and transitory components and combining them afterwards. Finally, we add the state-dependent non-employment risk.

**Income Taxation** We use the progressive income tax function from Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017),

$$T(y) = y - \tau_0 y^{1-\tau_1}.$$ 

---

15 This affects the mean of log earnings as well as the arrival rate of nonemployment shocks.

16 Mostly called Poisson processes in the literature.
Table 1: Earnings Process Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_a$ mean</td>
<td>$2.7408 + 0.4989t - 0.1137t^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_a$ standard deviation</td>
<td>0.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persistent Process</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_i$ arrival rate</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_i$ mean reversion rate</td>
<td>$-\log(0.983)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p^i_0$ mixture probability</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu^i_0$ location parameter</td>
<td>-0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^1_i$ std. dev. of first Normal</td>
<td>0.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2_i$ std. dev. of second Normal</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^0_0$ std. dev. of $z_0$</td>
<td>0.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transitory Shocks</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda^e$ arrival rate</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^e$ mean reversion rate</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p^e$ mixture probability</td>
<td>0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu^e$ location parameter</td>
<td>0.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^1_e$ std. dev. of first Normal</td>
<td>0.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2_e$ std. dev. of second Normal</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonemployment Shocks</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a$ constant</td>
<td>$-3.2740 - 0.8935t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b$ slope</td>
<td>$-4.5692 - 2.9203t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda^l_i$ exit rate</td>
<td>$1/0.9784$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If non-employed, households receive a fraction $b$ of their potential earnings from unemployment insurance. Thus, the post-tax disposable income is given by

$$\tilde{y}_t = \begin{cases} y^\text{pot}_{it} - T(y^\text{pot}_{it}) & \text{if employed} \\ b y^\text{pot}_{it} & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}$$

We follow Kaplan et al. (2020) in our choice of the parameters $\tau_0, \tau_1$. The progressivity parameter $\tau_1$ is an estimate from Heathcote et al. (2017) and the scale parameter $\tau_0$ is set to match the tax revenue from personal income tax and social security contribution as a share of GDP in 1980 (14.4%). The replacement rate is set to 32%, matching average unemployment insurance benefits, as a fraction of average wage, as reported by the US Department of Labor.

Preferences and demographics The discount rate $\rho$ and the utility weight of housing status $\xi$ are internally calibrated to match the economy-wide mortgage-debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios from the 1983 SCF. The interpretation of the utility weight $\xi$ differs from other models, because $\xi$ is the utility weight of housing status (not housing stock).

---

Table 2: Baseline Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$ strength of keeping up motive</td>
<td>Bellet (2019)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$ discount rate</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$ utility weight of housing</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>0.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}$ intra-temporal elasticity of substitution</td>
<td>Flavin and Nakagawa (2008, AER)</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$ inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution</td>
<td>standard</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{1}{m}$ constant mortality rate</td>
<td>45 years worklife</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing and financial technology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$ price elasticity of housing supply</td>
<td>Saiz (2010, QJE)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$ depreciation rate of housing</td>
<td>Bureau of Economic Analysis</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega$ maximum loan-to-value ratio</td>
<td>P95 of LTV</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a\bar{y}/\bar{y}$ exogenous net asset supply</td>
<td>cum. current account</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taxation and Unemployment Insurance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_0$ level of taxes</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>0.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_1$ progressivity</td>
<td>Heathcote et al. (2017)</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b$ replacement rate</td>
<td>Dept of Labor</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The literature has not yet converged to a common value for the intratemporal elasticity of substitution $\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}$. Estimates range from 0.13–0.24 (from structural models; e.g. Flavin and Nakagawa, 2008; Bajari, Chan, Krueger, and Miller, 2013) up to 1.25 (Ogaki and Reinhart, 1998; Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel, 2007, using estimates from aggregate data). Many papers have picked parameters out of this range.\textsuperscript{19} We follow the evidence from structurally estimated models and set the elasticity to 0.15.

The inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution $\gamma$ is set to the standard value 1.5. The constant annual mortality rate $m = 1/45$ is set to get an expected (working) lifetime of 45 years.

**Social comparisons** For the status function we use a ratio-specification $s(h, \bar{h}) = \frac{h}{h\bar{y}}$ as in Abel (1990). Bellet (2019) shows that this functional form captures the empirical finding that the utility loss from a big house decreases with own house size. Households with a medium sized house are more affected by top housing than households living in a small house.\textsuperscript{20}

We define the reference measure as the 90\textsuperscript{th} percentile of the (endogenous) housing distribution, $\bar{h} = h_{P90}$. This follows Bellet (2019) who shows that households are only sensitive to changes in the top quintile of the house (size) distribution and strongest when the reference measure is defined as the 90\textsuperscript{th} percentile.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19}Garriga and Hedlund (2020) use 0.13, Garriga, Manuelli, and Peralta-Alva (2019) use 0.5, many papers use Cobb-Douglas (that is, an elasticity of 1.0, e.g. Berger et al., 2018; Landvoigt, 2017) and Kaplan et al. (2020) use 1.25.

\textsuperscript{20}Note that the more tractable linear specification $(h - \phi\bar{h})$ as used in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Section 3 would imply the opposite relationship between own house size and comparison strength.

\textsuperscript{21}See Figure 6 in Bellet (2019).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Targeted moments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>moment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggregate loan-to-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggregate networth-to-income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tax-revenue-to-income</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The parameter $\phi$ pins down the strength of the comparison motive. It is the ratio of two utility elasticities

$$\phi = \frac{\text{elasticity of utility w.r.t. } \hat{h}}{\text{elasticity of utility w.r.t. } \bar{h}}$$

If the reference houses improves by 1%, then agents would have to improve their own house $\phi\%$ to keep utility constant. Bellet (2019) estimates $\phi$ to be between 0.6 and 0.8 when setting $\hat{h}$ equal to the 90th percentile of the housing distribution. We thus choose $\phi = 0.7$.\(^{22}\)

Note that Bellet (2019) estimates exactly this sensitivity allowing us to take his estimates without an intermediate indirect inference procedure.

**Technology and Financial Markets**

The construction technology parameter $\alpha$ is set to 0.6 so that the price elasticity of housing supply ($\alpha - \alpha_1$) equals 1.5, which is the median value across MSAs estimated by Saiz (2010). The maximum admissible loan-to-value ratio ($\omega$) is set to 0.85, to match the 95th percentile of the LTV distribution in the SCF (Kaplan et al., 2020, use a similar approach for setting the debt-service-to-income constraint). Finally, we specify the exogenous net supply of assets $a_S$ to match the net foreign debt position of the US. The net foreign debt position can be well approximated by the cumulative current account deficit of the US (Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot, 2017), which was 1% of GDP in 1980 (see also Figure 9).

**4.1 Internal calibration and model fit**

For the internal calibration we target the aggregate networth-to-income ratio (4.6) and the aggregate loan-to-value ratio (0.24) from the first wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances in 1983. We pick the utility weight of housing $\xi$ and the the discount rate $\rho$ so that simulated moments match their counterparts in the data. Table 3 shows that the model fits the data very well.

**5 Quantitative Results**

In this section we study how the model economy reacts to changes in the environment in the long-run. We compare the initial stationary equilibrium $E$ (corresponding to 1980) with alternative stationary equilibria $E^x$ where we adjust income inequality $I$, capital inflow (Saving Glut) $S$ and the collateral constraints $\omega$ to reflect the observed changes in the data.

---

\(^{22}\)See Table 2 in Bellet (2019)
In the first experiment we compare $E$ to $E^I$ where only income inequality rises. Afterwards we set these results into perspective, comparing them to equilibria that reflect other (combinations) of mechanisms like $E^S$ (Saving Glut), $E^\omega$ (relaxation of borrowing limit) and $E^{IS\omega}$ (all three mechanisms).

5.1 Rising inequality, mortgages and house prices

We now move to the main experiment of the paper. We start from the steady-state calibrated to the U.S. economy in 1980. Then we raise income inequality to match the level in 2007 and compare the mortgage debt, house prices and housing production between 1980 and 2007. Before getting to the results, we describe how we model the increase in income inequality.

5.1.1 Modelling rising inequality

As we have discussed in Section 4, the cross-sectional dispersion of income has increased substantially between 1980 and 2007. Given the evidence in Kopczuk et al. (2010) and Guvenen et al. (2014) we attribute the whole change in cross-sectional inequality to changes in permanent inequality. In our model permanent inequality is reflected by the standard deviation of the distribution of the permanent component $\sigma_\alpha$. Thus, we increase $\sigma_\alpha$ to match the increase in the cross-sectional P90/P50 ratio.

5.1.2 Results

Rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses creates both a mortgage boom and a house price boom in our model. Figure 7 shows that our mechanism generates an increase in the mortgage-to-income ratio of about 60%—about half of the increase that is observed in the data. Similarly, we generate a house price boom (+38%) that generates 62% of the increase in the data.

*Keeping up with the Joneses* are a quantitatively important to generate the results. Figure 8 shows how much of the simulated debt and mortgage booms can be obtained with
Notes: Comparison simulated changes in aggregate variables between the steady states in 1980 and 2007. “w/o keeping up” shows the changes when the reference measure $\bar{h}$ is kept fixed at level $h_{1980}$ from the initial stationary equilibrium.

rising inequality, but without status concerns.\textsuperscript{23} Without keeping up with the Joneses, the debt boom would be 71% weaker and the house price boom would be 44% weaker. The sizable effect of rising income inequality comes from general equilibrium effects. Rising inequality raises house prices and thus housing expenditures across the distribution. Since houses are financed by mortages, demand for credit increases. The interest rate rises to clear asset markets.

There are four channels at play. (i) Rising top incomes raise the demand for housing and house prices because the richer households want to live in bigger houses. (ii) Agents react to the new reference measure. They substitute houses for consumption to keep up with the Joneses. (iii) All households react to the higher house prices. Agents will spend a larger fraction of their income on houses, because houses and consumption are not perfect substitutes. (iv) The three channels above raise the demand for housing, and thus the demand for mortgages. Interest rates rise until demand for savings (i.e. credit supply) meets credit demand.

5.2 Horse race against alternative mechanisms

Rising inequality together with a “keeping up with the Joneses” motive is not the only possible explanation for the rise in mortgages and house prices. The main complementary mechanisms are the Global Saving Glut (capital inflow from emerging markets; Bernanke, 2005), financial innovation (securitization allows banks to lend more liberally to less creditworthy households; e.g. Favilukis et al., 2017) and a bubble in the housing market (house prices rose in expocetion of rising house prices; e.g. Kaplan et al., 2020).

In this section compare the magnitudes of two competing channels (Saving Glut and relaxation of borrowing limits) with our main mechanism. Analyzing the role of expectations for the housing boom is beyond the scope of our model.

\textsuperscript{23}Instead of recalibrating the model with $s(h, \bar{h}) = h$ one can use that for a given reference measure $\bar{h}$ that is constant across the population, the initial equilibrium $E$ is equivalent to a parameterization with $s(h, \bar{h}) = h$ and housing weight $\xi$ such that $\frac{1}{1+\xi} = \frac{1}{1+\bar{h}}$. This holds because our specification of social comparisons, just reweights the utility of housing and consumption.
5.2.1 Global Saving Glut

Just like the US mortgage boom, growing international imbalances have been discussed as a source of instability leading to the Global Financial Crisis. Bernanke (2005, then Fed governor) was one of the first to interpret these imbalances not in terms of trade imbalances, but as an accumulation of external debt: The cumulative current account deficit is approximately equal to the net foreign asset position. As seen in Figure 9 the cumulative current account reached $-40\%$ of GDP in 2006. That is, the US was a net debtor with net debt amounting to $40\%$ of GDP\(^{24}\).

Bernanke (2005) also provides a potential source for this rise in foreign debt: the steep increase in the global demand for savings, especially from China and India. He argues that these savings flowed into the US economy, building up the US debt position. Through the lens of our model, the global saving glut changes the market clearing condition (2) of the asset and mortgage market. Exogenous asset supply is given by \(a_s^S\), where \(a_s^S / \bar{y}_t\) is the cumulative current account from Figure 9 (\(\bar{y}_t\) is average pre-tax earnings, our measure of GDP).

Comparing the Saving Glut to our main mechanism, Figure 11 shows that the Saving Glut indeed causes a substantial increase in the mortgage-to-income ratio (at the same order of magnitude as inequality and keeping up with the Joneses) and only a very weak increase in house prices if inequality is held fixed at the 1980 level.

Note that the way we model the Saving Glut potentially biases the effects upwards. We assume that the capital inflow is purely driven by foreign demand for assets. If, on the other hand, part of the capital inflow is driven by increased supply of assets (from higher demand for mortgages), the part of the external debt position might just be a symptom of a demand-side mechanism like ours. Assuming a small open economy (constant interest rate), our main mechanism generates a mortgage boom that is large enough to explain the build-up of external debt. Kumhof, Ranciere, Richter, Throckmorton, Winant, and Ozsögiü (2017) indeed find that rising top incomes are an important predictor of a current

\(^{24}\)Gourinchas et al. (2017) estimate that the precise net foreign asset position was less negative due to valuation effects.
account deficits (and thus, foreign debt). In this case, the Saving Glut (the increased demand for assets) would be less powerful.

5.2.2 Financial liberalization and innovation

Another prominent explanation for debt boom is a relaxation of constraints in the financial sector. These might come from regulatory changes or financial innovation. In 2007, banks could give out more mortgages than in 1980 because law required lower collateral requirements on the banks’ and the households’ balance sheets. Moreover, banks’ technology might have improved, so that they are no able to lend on worse terms (e.g. higher loan-to-value ratios). Favilukis et al. (2017) and Justiniano et al. (2019) have shown that under certain condition the relaxation of constraints can have sizable effects on total lending. We show, that in our model this is not the case because interest rates rise in general equilibrium.

We model financial liberalization and financial innovation in a reduced form way. We assume that the exogenous LTV limit ($\omega_t$) increases over time. As a proxy for this borrowing limit, we use the 95th percentile of the LTV distribution in the Surveys of Consumer Finances, which is shown in Figure 10. In line with the data we assume that the LTV limit increases from $\omega_{1980} = 0.85$ in 1980 to $\omega_{2007} = 0.96$.

Figure 11 shows that in general equilibrium, this mechanism doesn’t contribute to the debt and house price booms. These results differ from Favilukis et al. (2017) because there are not many constrained agents in our equilibrium. Their equilibrium is constructed in a way that a big part of the population is at or close to the constraint. Moreover, they use an exogenous inflow of capital to keep the interest rate down.

5.2.3 Decomposition of the three mechanisms

Instead of looking at the channels individually, we will now analyze their marginal effects. We add three mechanisms to the baseline economy one by one and compute their marginal effects. In a first step we compare the baseline economy $E$ with the Saving Glut economy $E^S$. Then we compute the marginal effect of adding rising inequality and keeping up
with the Joneses in $E^{IS}$ and finally we compute the marginal effect of a relaxation of the collateral constraint in $E^{ISω}$.

All three mechanisms together generate an increase in the mortgage-to-income ratio of 83% and an increase in house prices of 38%. In Figure 12 and Table 6 we provide a decomposition. The contributions of each channel depends on the ordering in which they are added. Rising inequality and social comparison contributes between 39% and 72% to the total generated increase in mortgage-to-income and more than 95% of the total generated house price boom. The Saving Glut contributes 21–55% to the debt boom and has only negligible effects on house prices. Relaxation of the collateral constraint has only a minor contribution to both.

Thus, rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses are an important amplifier of the Saving Glut when it comes to mortgage debt. Moreover, among the three mechanisms, rising inequality and and keeping up with the Joneses is the only channel that generates a substantial increase in house prices.

### 5.2.4 Mortgages and houses across the income distribution

The mechanisms have different predictions on how housing and mortgage holdings change across the income distribution. Figure 13 shows the percentage change of house value ($ph$) and mortgage holdings as a fraction of income across the income distribution. In the data, there is an inverse-U shape in housing growth. The middle income quintiles had the strongest growth in house-value-to-income. Rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses generates a very similar pattern, where the second and the third quintiles react strongest. The Saving Glut predicts only negligible effects on housing across the income distribution, and it does counterfactually predict that the effect is increasing over the income distribution.
6 Empirical Analysis: Mortgages and Top Incomes Across US States

The coincidence of the mortgage and inequality booms (Figure 1b) suggests that there is link between mortgage debt and top income inequality. In this Section we provide novel empirical evidence on this link. (i) We show that there is a positive relationship between mortgage debt of the non-rich and top incomes across US states. (ii) The effect is persistent and sizable. A 1% increase in top incomes will lead to a cumulative 1% increase in mortgage debt over a 10 year horizon. (iii) This relationship does not exists for non-mortgage debt. If anything, non-mortgage debt of the non-rich seems to be negatively correlated with top incomes.

6.1 Data

Our data set is aggregated from US distributional national accounts (DINA) data (from Piketty et al., 2018). These are complemented with IRS data as in Mian et al. (2020). We construct a state-year-income-group panel for the period 1980–2007 covering income, outstanding mortgages and outstanding non-mortgage debt. The US-DINA data were constructed by Piketty et al. (2018) to study the evolution of economic inequality over time. The data were compiled from tax, survey, and national accounts data and cover the joint distribution of income and wealth, including household debt, also across U.S. states. The DINA data allow us split the data by state, debt category and income group.

6.2 Approach

We use average top incomes of the top 10% as our measure of income inequality. This has two reasons. First, Piketty et al. (2018) show that average incomes of the bottom 50% have stagnated between 1980 and 2007 while incomes of the top 10% have doubled in the US. So, top incomes capture an important dimension of the change in income inequality.
over this time period. And second, we show in Section 3 that this exact nature of rising inequality drives debt under the *comparisons channel*.

We will use the following notation. Let \( \text{incomes}^g_{s,t} \) be the average income and \( \text{debt}^g_{st} \) be the average debt for the income group \( g \) in state \( s \) and year \( t \). We consider the income groups

\[
g \in \{ \text{bottom 90\%}, \text{bottom 50\%}, \text{middle 40\%} \}.
\]

Let further \( \text{top incomes}_{s,t} \) be the average incomes of the top 10\% in a given state \( s \) and year \( t \).

### 6.3 Debt and Inequality Over the Long-run (1980–2007)

First, we look at simple long-run correlations between income inequality and debt. We show that there is a positive relationship between top incomes and indebtedness of the non-rich. This relationship is driven by mortgages only.

For a state \( s \) and income group \( g \) we look at the following relationship,

\[
\Delta \left( \frac{\text{debt}^g_{s,t}}{\text{incomes}^g_{s,t}} \right) = \alpha + \beta \Delta \log(\text{top incomes}_s) + \epsilon^g_{st},
\]

where we look at changes between 1980 and 2007. Column A of Figure 14 shows that there is a positive relationship between household debt growth and growth in top incomes. This positive relationship is present in household debt across the income distribution.

Column B of Figure 14 reveals that this relationship between debt and inequality is only driven by mortgages. We split total household debt in mortgage debt and non-mortgage debt. While the positive relationship between debt and top incomes is preserved for mortgages, non-mortgage debt growth even seems to be slightly negatively related to changes in top incomes.

### 6.4 State-Year Variation

The regression model (4) uses only the information of the years 1980 and 2007. We now estimate a fixed effect regression using the full state-year-income group panel. We estimate a set of regression models of the form

\[
\log(\text{debt}^g_{st}) = \alpha + \beta \log(\text{top incomes}^g_{s,t-1}) + \gamma \log(\text{incomes}^g_{st}) + \delta_s + \delta_t + \epsilon_{st}
\]

for the two different debt categories (mortgage debt, non-mortgage debt). If \( \beta \) is positive, higher top income levels are associated with higher current levels of non-rich debt when non-rich incomes are held constant and state and year effects (\( \delta_s, \delta_t \)) are controlled for.

Table 4 shows that this coefficients is indeed positive. A 10\% increase in top incomes is associated with a 1.6\% increase in total debt of the bottom 90\%. Hence there is both economically and statistically significant co-variation of local top incomes and non-rich debt. Like in the previous specification this relationship is entirely driven by mortgage debt, which grows by 2.3\%. While mortgage debt is affected by top incomes, non-mortgage debt is not.
Figure 14: Correlation of long-run changes in non-rich debt and top incomes

Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the change in debt-to-income (total, mortgage, non-mortgage) of non-rich households (bottom 90%, middle 40%, bottom 50 % of the income distribution) and the change in top 10% incomes between 1980 and 2007 across US states.
Figure 15: Conditional correlation of non-rich debt and top incomes

Notes: This figure shows the relationship between debt (total, mortgage, non-mortgage) of non-rich households (bottom 90%, middle 40%, bottom 50% of income distribution) and lag 1 of top 10% incomes conditional on state and year fixed effects and non-rich income. All variables are demeaned. The slope of the regression line is equal to the conditional elasticity. Each dot represents the mean of the log of lagged average top incomes and the mean of the log of average non-rich-debt within 20 equal-sized bins of the x-variable.

Figure 15 visualizes the estimation results by showing residualized binned scatter plots of non-rich debt and top incomes. The slope of the fit is equal to $\beta$ in equation (5). The regression model is able to capture a substantial amount of the relationship of non-rich debt and top incomes after accounting for fixed effects and non-rich income.

6.5 Impulse Responses from Local Projections

We now analyze the dynamic response of non-rich debt to changes in top incomes. In particular, we estimate the impulse response function of non-rich debt using local projections of the form

$$
\Delta^{h+1} \log(\text{debt}_{s,t+h}) = \alpha^h + \beta^h \Delta \log(\text{top incomes}_{st}) + \delta^h + \\
\sum_{k=1}^{3} \left( \gamma^h_k \log(\text{debt}_{s,t-k}^g) + \phi^h_k \log(\text{top incomes}_{s,t-k}) \right) + \epsilon^h_{st}
$$

(6)
Table 4: The relationship between non-rich debt and top incomes: Fixed Effects Regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(A) bottom 90%</th>
<th></th>
<th>(B) bottom 50%</th>
<th></th>
<th>(C) middle 40%</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>non-mortgage</td>
<td>mortgage</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>non-mortgage</td>
<td>mortgage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lag(log(top incomes), 1)</td>
<td>0.172**</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.272**</td>
<td>0.303***</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.485***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(own income)</td>
<td>0.911***</td>
<td>0.516***</td>
<td>1.107***</td>
<td>0.433***</td>
<td>0.384***</td>
<td>0.482***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimator</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>1,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.957</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table shows the results of regression model in equation (XX) using state-year variation across the US for 1980 to 2007. Standard errors in parentheses. The stars indicate the range of the $p$ value: $*** \leq 0.01 \leq ** \leq 0.05 \leq * \leq 0.1$. Data: DINA, IRS.
for each \( h \in \{0, \ldots, 10\} \), where

\[
\Delta^{h+1} \log(d_\text{e}_s,t+h) = \log(d_\text{e}_s,t+h) - \log(d_\text{e}_s,t-1).
\]

The coefficients \( \beta^h \) give us the cumulative % change in non-rich debt that is induced by a one-time change in top-incomes by 1%. Figure 16 plots the estimated impulse response function for mortgage and non-mortgage debt for the middle 40% and bottom 50% of the income distribution. By adding past debt and inequality measures as controls, specification (6) essentially compares states with the same pre trends in debt and inequality, but where one state experiences a stronger increase in inequality in \( t \).

Consistent with the previous specifications, top incomes drive up mortgage debt substantially over the following ten years while non-mortgage debt remains roughly constant. The elasticity of mortgage debt with respect to top incomes is somewhat higher for the middle 40% than for the bottom 50% and more precisely estimated. For the middle 40%, a 10% increase in top incomes from \( t-1 \) to \( t \) translates into persistent increase in mortgage debt of roughly 12% after ten years. The same change in top incomes is associated with a 6% increase in mortgage debt of the bottom 50%. For non-mortgage debt, there are no (persistent) effects in both income groups.

6.6 Taking Stock

These results are no evidence of a causal relationship between top incomes and mortgage debt. But they can help evaluate theoretical mechanisms. The established savings channel by Kumhof et al. (2015) and Mian et al. (2020) can not account for facts (i) and (iii) if financial markets are sufficiently integrated. Local demand for savings need neither be compensated by local debt, nor by mortgages alone. Instead, arbitrage should lead to a uniform increase in debt of the non-rich across all states and across both debt categories. The savings channel alone cannot account for all of the variation in debt growth during the debt boom.

By contrast, the comparisons channel put forward in this paper is consistent with each of these findings. It should be regarded as an important complementary mechanism to understand the debt boom and its relationship to top income inequality.

7 Conclusion

Rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses were an important driver of mortgage debt and house prices in the decades prior to the Great Recession. In our calibrated heterogeneous agent macroeconomic model, rising inequality and keeping up with the richer Joneses generate an increase in the mortgage-to-income ratio of around 60%, about half as much as observed in the data between 1980 and 2007.

This mechanism is also an important amplifier of alternative mechanisms that raise debt-to-income ratios. In a model with exogenous capital inflow (to capture the Global

\[25\text{Controlling for lags of non-rich income does not change the estimated IRFs.}\]
Figure 16: Impulse responses from local projections

Notes: This figure shows the cumulative effect of a 1% change in top 10% incomes on mortgage and non-mortgage debt of the middle 40% and bottom 50%. The confidence bands are constructed using a significance level of 10%.
Saving Glut) and relaxing borrowing constraints (to capture financial liberalization) adding keeping up with the Joneses and rising inequality boosts the debt boom by a factor of two (generating 83% instead of 38%). Among these three mechanisms, rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses is the only mechanism that generates a sizable house price boom (generating 62% of that observed in the data).

We show analytically that under social comparisons households’ optimal debt level is increasing in incomes of the direct and indirect reference group. When everybody is directly or indirectly connected to the rich, aggregate debt rises in response to rising top incomes. Our tractable framework exposes how this mechanism works. Households substitute durable houses for non-durable consumption when top incomes rise because houses are a status good. Since houses are durable, they are optimally debt-financed such that an increase in the housing share also increases debt levels and debt-to-income ratios.

Finally, we empirically show that non-rich debt and top incomes co-move not only on aggregate but also on the state level. Importantly, this relationship is driven entirely by mortgage debt. There is no link between local top incomes and local non-mortgage debt.

These findings support our theoretical and quantitative analysis in two ways. First, it shows that there is a strong and robust empirical relationship between top income inequality and household debt. This merits the study of inequality as a relevant driver of the debt boom. And second, it is consistent with upward-looking comparisons being the causal driver linking inequality and household debt. While our model abstracts from the spatial dimension of inequality and debt, housing comparisons are likely spatially restricted (Bellet, 2019) giving rise to the state-level relationship between top incomes and non-rich mortgage debt.

The Saving Glut of the Rich (Mian et al., 2020) – the other mechanism that links inequality and household debt – is not able to account for these findings for two reasons. First, financial markets are largely integrated such that interest rates do not vary significantly across states. Second, even if there was sufficient variation across states, falling interest rates should raise non-mortgage debt just like mortgages. Note, however, that our findings are not inconsistent with, and thus complementary to, the saving gluts being important drivers of the debt boom. Our analysis shows that upward-looking housing comparisons were an equally important driver of the aggregate debt boom.

Avenues for future research With our mechanisms, rising inequality can be an important amplifier of financial crises. First, it amplifies the aggregate consumption response to house price shocks, because these housing wealth effects are increasing in the house share (Berger et al., 2018; Greimel and Zadow, 2019). Second, trends in top income inequality can lead to expectations of future house price growth, and thus serve as a trigger for the expectations channel of the housing boom and bust (Kaplan et al., 2020).

The insights from this paper can also lead to interesting research in international finance. It provides a different angle on the growing current account imbalances of the US. Rising demand for credit can attract foreign capital leading to a current account deficit.
References


A  Data sources

Figure 1: Aggregate debt and inequality  We data on outstanding household debt from the US Flow of Funds, retrieved from FRED: total debt (TLBSHNO) and mortgages (HMLBSHNO). Other debt is constructed as the difference between total debt and mortgages. Debt is displayed as a share of nominal GDP (Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA, via FRED: GDP).

The top 10% income share is from the World Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo et al., 2016).

A.1 Horse race

Figure 9: Net foreign debt position of the US  We use the current account and GDP series from the BEA, retrieved via FRED (BOPBCA, GDP). Following Gourinchas et al. (2017) we compute the cumulative sum of the current account

$$\text{cum CA}_t = \sum_{i=1960}^t CA_t$$

and show it as a fraction of GDP in that given year $\frac{\text{cum CA}_t}{\text{GDP}_t}$.

Figure 10: P95 of LTV distribution (proxy for $\omega$)  We use the micro data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We join all five imputations and treat them as one data set. This is fine since we don’t do inference. We use the definition of mortgages and house value from above. We calculate individual LTV$_{i,t} = \frac{\text{outstanding mortgages}_{i,t}}{\text{house}_{i,t}}$. For each year we report the 95% percentile of the LTV distribution.

B  Proofs

B.1 Lemmas

Lemma 1. The necessary conditions for an optimum of the households’ problem are

\begin{align}
    u_c(c_t, s(h_t, \bar{h}_t)) &= \lambda_t \\
    u_s(c_t, s(h_t, \bar{h}_t))s_h(h_t, \bar{h}_t) &= \lambda_t (r + \delta)p \\
    \dot{\lambda}_t - \rho \lambda_t &= -r \lambda_t
\end{align}

where $\lambda$ is the co-state in the continuous time optimization problem.

Proof. Without adjustment costs, the two endogenous state variables $a_t$ and $h_t$ collapse into one state variable net worth $w_t$.

$$\dot{w}_t = rw_t + y_t - (r + \delta)p h_t - c_t$$

The present-value Hamiltonian is

$$H(w, h, c, \lambda) = u\{c, s(h, \bar{h})\} + \lambda(rw_t + y_t - (r + \delta)p h_t - c_t)$$

38
where $w$ is the state, $c$ and $h$ are the controls and $\lambda$ is the co-state. The necessary conditions are
\[
\frac{\partial H(w_t, h_t, c_t, \lambda_t)}{\partial c} = u_c(c_t, s(h_t, \bar{h}_t)) - \lambda_t = 0
\]
\[
\frac{\partial H(w_t, h_t, c_t, \lambda_t)}{\partial h} = u_s(c_t, s(h_t, \bar{h}_t)) s_{h}(h_t, \bar{h}_t) - \lambda_t(r + \delta)p = 0
\]
\[
\dot{\lambda}_t - \rho \lambda_t = \frac{\partial H(w_t, h_t, c_t, \lambda_t)}{\partial w} = -r \lambda_t.
\]

**Lemma 2.** Under our assumption of CRRA-CES preferences, the optimal relation of $c_t$ and $h_t$ is given by
\[
\frac{\xi}{1 - \xi} \left( \frac{s(h_t, \bar{h}_t)}{c_t} \right)^{\epsilon-1} s_{h}(h_t, \bar{h}_t) = (r + \delta)p.
\]
Further assuming Assumption 3 yields
\[
c_t = \kappa_0 h_t - \kappa_0 \phi \bar{h}_t, \quad \text{where } \kappa_0 = \left( (r + \delta)p \frac{1 - \xi}{\xi} \right)^{-1}.
\]

**Proof.** Combining conditions (7) and (8) yields
\[
\frac{u_s(c_t, s_t)}{u_c(c_t, s_t)} s_{h}(h_t, \bar{h}_t) = (r + \delta)p.
\]
For the given CRRA-CES preferences the marginal utilities are given by
\[
u_e(c_t, s_t) = ((1 - \xi)c_t^{\epsilon} + \xi s_t^{\epsilon})^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} - 1 (1 - \xi)c_t^{\epsilon-1}
\]
\[
u_s(c_t, s_t) = ((1 - \xi)^{\epsilon} + \xi s_t^{\epsilon})^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} - 1 \xi s_t^{\epsilon-1}.
\]
Thus,
\[
\frac{u_s(c_t, s_t)}{u_c(c_t, s_t)} = \frac{\xi}{1 - \xi} \left( \frac{s_t}{c_t} \right)^{\epsilon-1}.
\]
Plugging in above yields the first statement. Using Assumption 3 we get
\[
\frac{\xi}{1 - \xi} \left( \frac{h_t - \phi \bar{h}_t}{c_t} \right)^{\epsilon-1} = (r + \delta)p.
\]
\[
\left( \frac{c_t}{h_t - \phi \bar{h}_t} \right) = \left( (r + \delta)p \frac{1 - \xi}{\xi} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} = \kappa_0
\]
\[
c_t = \kappa_0 h_t - \kappa_0 \phi \bar{h}_t
\]

**Lemma 3.** Under the assumption of time-constant house prices $p$, and all previous assumptions of this section, individual choices $c_t, h_t$ are constant over time.

**Proof.** The costate $\lambda$ is constant over time. This follows from using Assumption 1 in condition (9), which gives $\dot{\lambda}_t = 0$.

Plugging in (11) in condition (8) one gets that an decreasing function of $h$ is constant over time, thus $h_t$ is constant over time. Knowing that $h_t$ constant over time, and a similar argument for condition (7) it follows that $c_t$ is constant over time.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1

From the lemmas above we get that
\[ c = \kappa_0 s(h, \bar{h}) = \kappa_0 h - \kappa_0 \phi \bar{h}. \]

Using the lifetime budget constraint we get
\[ Y := r a_0 + y = p h(r + \delta) + c \]
\[ = h \left( p(r + \delta) + \kappa_0 \right) - \kappa_0 \phi \bar{h} \]
\[ \Rightarrow h = \frac{Y + \kappa_0 \phi \bar{h}}{p(r + \delta) + \kappa_0} = \frac{1}{\kappa_2} Y + \frac{\kappa_0}{p(r + \delta) + \kappa_0} \phi \bar{h} = \kappa_2 Y + \kappa_1 \phi \bar{h} \quad (13) \]

where
\[ \kappa_1 := \frac{\kappa_0}{p(r + \delta) + \kappa_0} = \frac{1}{\frac{p(r + \delta)}{\kappa_0} + 1} \in (0, 1) \]

since
\[ \frac{p(r + \delta)}{\kappa_0} = \left( \frac{1}{(r + \delta)p} \right)^{1/\delta} \left( \frac{\xi}{1 - \xi} \right)^{1/\delta} > 0. \]

Stacking equations (13) for and using \( \bar{h} = G h \)
\[ h = \kappa_2 Y + \kappa_1 \phi G h \]
\[ h = \left( I - \kappa_1 \phi G \right)^{-1} \kappa_2 Y = \left( \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (\kappa_1 \phi G)^i \right) \kappa_2 Y. \]

Moreover,
\[ \bar{h} = G h = \frac{\kappa_1 \phi}{\kappa_1 \phi} G \left( \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (\kappa_1 \phi G)^i \right) \kappa_2 Y \]
\[ = \frac{1}{\kappa_1 \phi} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} (\kappa_1 \phi G)^i \right) \kappa_2 Y \]
\[ = \frac{1}{\kappa_0 \phi} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} (\kappa_1 \phi G)^i \right) Y \]
\[ (I - \kappa_1 \phi G)^{-1} \] is a Leontief inverse. It exists if the matrix power series \( \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (\kappa_1 \phi G)^i \) converges\(^26\). In that case
\[ (I - \kappa_1 \phi G)^{-1} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (\kappa_1 \phi G)^i. \]

Now, we calculate debt.
\[ -r a = y - \delta p h - c \]

\(^26\)This is the case for all nilpotent matrices (there exists a power \( p \) such that \( G^p = 0 I \) (there are no infinitely-long paths in the network) or if all eigenvalues of \( \kappa_1 \phi G \) are between 0 and 1. This holds whenever \( G \) can be interpreted as a Markov Chain.
using B.2,

\[ y - \delta p h - \kappa_0 h + \kappa_0 \phi \bar{h} = y - (\delta p + \kappa_0) h + \kappa_0 \phi \bar{h} \]

\[ -ra = y - (\delta p + \kappa_0) \left( \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (\kappa_1 G)^i \right) \kappa_2 \mathbf{y} + \left( \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} (\kappa_1 G)^i \right) \mathbf{y} \]

\[ = y - \kappa_3 \mathbf{y} + (1 - \kappa_3) \left( \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} (\kappa_1 G)^i \right) \mathbf{y} \]

where

\[ \kappa_3 = (\delta p + \kappa_0) \kappa_2 = \frac{\delta p + \kappa_0}{p(r_0 + \delta) + \kappa_0} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{p \rho}{\delta p + \kappa_0}} \in (0, 1). \]

C Numerical solution for a stationary equilibrium

We first describe how we discretize the complex income process, then we show how to solve the partial equilibrium using a finite difference method from Achdou et al. (2017). Finally we present the algorithm used to compute equilibrium prices and reference measure.

The model was solved using version 1.2 of the Julia language. For a given parameterization, 200 endogenous grid points and 2000 exogenous gridpoints solving for a general equilibrium takes about 30 minutes on standard laptop using just one core.

For the calibration we ran the code in parallel (using 30 nodes with 16 cores) for 12 hours on a high performance cluster.

C.1 Discretizing the income process

Pre-tax earnings depend on four exogenous states \( \theta = (\tilde{\alpha}, z, \epsilon, \nu) \),

\[ y(\theta) = (1 - \nu) \exp(\tilde{\alpha} + z + \epsilon). \]

We first discretize the two jump-drift processes \( z \) and \( \epsilon \) following the procedure of Kaplan et al. (2018). We discretize them separately, creating two continuous time Markov chains and combining them. The statespace of the combined continuous time Markov Chain is given by

\[ \{z_1, \ldots, z_{N_z}\} \times \{\epsilon_1 \ldots \epsilon_{N_\epsilon}\}. \]

Then we add non-employment states for each state, where the transition probabilities into the non-employment state are state-dependent. The statespace of the CTMC with non-employment becomes

\[ \{z_1, \ldots, z_{N_z}\} \times \{\epsilon_1 \ldots \epsilon_{N_\epsilon}\} \times \{0, 1\}. \]

Finally we add the discretize the permanent component \( \tilde{\alpha} \). We choose \( N_\alpha = 10 \) gridpoints, where each of those gridpoints represents a decile of \( \tilde{\alpha} \)'s distribution. Conditional on drawing \( \tilde{\alpha}_i \), the other three components follow the same CTMC with \( N_z \cdot N_\epsilon \cdot 2 \) states. Denote the changing states by \( \tilde{\theta} = (z, \epsilon, \nu) \)

The transition between states \( \tilde{\theta} \) is given by the intensities \( q_{ij} \). For an agent at state \( \tilde{\theta}_i \) the probability of jumping to a new state \( \tilde{\theta}_j \) within the time short time period \( \Delta \) is approximately
given by $p_{ij}(\Delta) \approx q_{ij}\Delta$. More precisely, given the intensity matrix $Q = (q_{ij})$ where $q_{ij} \geq 0$ for $i \neq j$ and $q_{ii} = -\sum_{k \neq i} q_{ik}$, the matrix of transition probabilities is given by

$$P(\Delta) = \exp(-\Delta Q),$$

where $\exp$ is the matrix exponential. $P(\Delta)$ is a stochastic matrix.

### C.2 Partial equilibrium given $p, r, \bar{h}$

Given prices $(p, r)$ and reference measure $\bar{h}$ the households’ problem can be characterized by a coupled system of partial differential equations: the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and the Kolmogorov forward (KF) equation. The HJB equation describes the optimization problem of the households and the KF equation describes the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution $\mu(da, dh, dy)$.

We solve these two equations using the finite difference method from Achdou et al. (2017). The discretized system can be written as

$$\rho v = u(v) + A(v; r, p, \bar{h})v$$

$$0 = (A(v; r, p, \bar{h}) + M)^T g,$$

where $v$ is the discretized value function, $g$ is the discretized cross-sectional distribution, $u(v)$ is the discretized flow utility, $A(v; r, p, \bar{h})$ is the discretized infinitesimal generator of the HJB equation (a very sparse matrix) and $M$ is a matrix that corrects the intensities for births and deaths. The discretized system reveals how tightly coupled the HJB and KF equations are. Once it is known from the solution of the HJB equation, it can be directly used to get the distribution $g$ from the KF equation.

#### C.2.1 Solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation

We assume that housing $h$ can be adjusted frictionlessly. So the two states $h$ and $a$ collapse into one, “net worth”

$$w_t = a_t + ph_t,$$

with its law of motion

$$\dot{w}_t = rw_t + y_t - (r + \delta)ph_t - c_t.$$

The collateral constraint can be rewritten in terms of $w$

$$w_t = ph_t + a_t \geq ph_t - \omega ph_t$$

$$\implies ph_t \leq \frac{w_t}{1 - \omega}.$$

The households’ HJB equation is

$$(\rho + m)v(w, \theta_i) = \max_{c, h \leq \frac{w_t}{1 - \omega}} u(c, s(h, \bar{h}))$$

$$+ v_w(w, \theta_i)(rw + \theta_i - (r + \delta)ph - c)$$

$$+ \sum_{k \neq i} q_{ik}(v(w, \theta_k) - v(w, \theta_i)).$$
The intensities $q_{ij}$ are the intensities of the continuous time Markov chain from Section C.1.

In order to solve this equation, we need to replace the maximum operator with the maximized Hamiltonian. That is, we need to plug in the optimal policy functions $c^*(w, y), h^*(w, y)$ which are given in Corollary 4 below. The result depends on the following lemma.

**Lemma 4.** When the collateral constraint is slack, we get the optimality conditions

$$h(w, y) = \left( \frac{1}{\tau_2} (\bar{h}^{\phi} (p + \delta) pv_{w}(w, y)) \right)^{-\frac{1}{\tau}} \bar{h}^{\phi}$$

$$c(w, y) = s(h(w, y), \bar{h}) \tau_1,$$

where $\tau_1 = \left( (r + \delta)p \frac{1 - \xi}{\xi} \bar{h}^{\phi} \right)^{\frac{1}{r - \gamma}}$ and $\tau_2 = ((1 - \xi) \tau_1^\gamma + \xi)^{\frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma}} \xi.$

**Proof.** Using the optimality conditions (10) and (8) with (12) we get

\[
(r + \delta)p = \frac{u_s(c, s)}{u_c(c, s)} s_h(h, \bar{h}) = \frac{\xi}{1 - \xi} \left( \frac{s(h, \bar{h})}{c(h, \bar{h})} \right)^{\gamma - 1} s_h(h, \bar{h}) \tag{25}
\]

\[
(r + \delta)pv_{w}(w, y) = u_s(c, s) s_h = ((1 - \xi)c^\phi + \xi s^\phi)^{\frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma}} \xi s^{\gamma - 1} s_h. \tag{26}
\]

Using (25) we express optimal $c$ as a function of optimal $s$

$$c(h, \bar{h}) = s(h, \bar{h}) \left( (r + \delta)p \frac{1 - \xi}{\xi} \frac{1}{s_h(h, \bar{h})} \right)^{\frac{1}{r - \gamma}}$$

using the ratio specification for $s$

$$= s(h, \bar{h}) \left( (r + \delta)p \frac{1 - \xi}{\xi} \bar{h}^{\phi} \right)^{\frac{1}{r - \gamma}} =: s(h, \bar{h}) \tau_1.$$

Then we can plug this expression into (26) and get

\[
(r + \delta)pv_{w}(w, y) = ((1 - \xi)(\tau_1 s)^\gamma + \xi s^\gamma)^{\frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma}} \xi s^{\gamma - 1} s_h
\]

\[
= ((1 - \xi) \tau_1^\gamma + \xi)^{\frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma}} \xi s^{1 - \gamma - \epsilon \gamma} s^{\gamma - 1} s_h
\]

\[
= \tau_2 s^{\gamma - \gamma} s_h
\]

Thus we get

$$s(h, \bar{h}) = \left( \frac{(r + \delta)pv_{w}(w, y)}{\tau_2 s_h} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}},$$

and using ratio-specification for $s$,

$$h = \left( \frac{1}{\tau_2} ((r + \delta)pv_{w}(w, y) \bar{h}^{\phi}) \right)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \bar{h}^{\phi}. \quad \Box$$

**Corollary 4.** The optimal policies are given by

$$h^*(w, y) = \begin{cases} h(w, y) & \text{if } h(w, y) < \frac{w}{p(1-w)} \\ \frac{w}{p(1-w)} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad c^*(w, y) = \begin{cases} c(w, y) & \text{if } h(w, y) < \frac{w}{p(1-w)} \\ \frac{c(w, y)}{c(w, y)} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
where $h(w, y)$ and $c(w, y)$ are from Lemma 4 and $\tilde{c}(w, y)$ is the solution to the optimality condition for $c$, given $h = \frac{w}{p(1-\omega)}$,

\[ v_w(w, y) = ((1 - \xi) c^\varepsilon + \xi s^\varepsilon)^{\frac{\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}} (1 - \xi) c^{-1}, \]

which is solved numerically.

Given the optimal policies, it is straightforward to solve the HJB using the implicit upwind scheme in Achdou et al. (2017).

C.2.2 Solving the Kolmogorov forward equation

We construct the birth and death matrix $M$ as in Kaplan et al. (2018) and solve for the distribution using the implicit scheme from Achdou et al. (2017).

C.3 General equilibrium: Solving for $r$, $p$ and $h$

We use the following algorithm to compute general equilibria.

0. Guess $r_0$, $p_0$ and $\bar{h}_0$

1. Clear housing markets given $r_{n-1}$ and $\bar{h}_{n-1}$
   (a) Use Newton steps until the sign of the excess demand for housing changes
   (b) Use Bisection to find the market clearing price $p_n$

2. Compute the excess demand on the asset market

3. Use a Newton step to update the interest rate $r_n$

4. Compute the implied reference measure $\bar{h}_x$ and update $\bar{h}_n = \bar{h}_{n-1} + a(\bar{h}_x - \bar{h}_{n-1})$

5. If $r_n \approx r_{n-1}$ and $\bar{h}_n \approx \bar{h}_{n-1}$, an equilibrium has been found. If not, go back to step 1.
In this appendix we show the tables corresponding to the figures in the main text.

**Table 5:** Disentangling the effects of rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>mortgage-to-income</th>
<th>house prices</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>growth</td>
<td>share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising inequality</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; Keeping up</td>
<td>+0.43</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Table 6:** Decomposition of the contributions of the three channels on the mortgage and house price booms.

(a) Starting from Keeping up with the Joneses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>house prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>growth</td>
<td>share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality and keeping up</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; Saving Glut</td>
<td>+0.17</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; Relaxed collateral constraint</td>
<td>+0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</table>

(b) Starting from the Saving Glut

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>share</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saving Glut</td>
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<td>0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>&amp; Inequality and keeping up</td>
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<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; Relaxed collateral constraint</td>
<td>+0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7:** The effects of each channels on mortgages and house prices

<table>
<thead>
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<th>mortgage-to-income</th>
<th>house prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>growth</td>
<td>% of data</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inequality and keeping up</td>
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<td>Saving Glut</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relaxed collateral constraint</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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